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THE EPA IS ONLY “SORT OF” PERMITTED TO REGULATE 
GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT: HOW 
UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP V. EPA SHOWS THE 




The recent Supreme Court decision in Utility Air Regulatory 
Group v. EPA1 (“UARG”) addressed the scope of the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) authority to regulate greenhouse gas2 
(“GHG”) emissions from stationary sources under the Clean Air Act3 
(“CAA” or “the Act”).4  In UARG, the Court examined the EPA’s 
permitting requirements for stationary sources that emitted, or poten-
tially would emit, GHGs.5  The Court determined that the EPA is not 
authorized to regulate a stationary source based on its potential to 
emit GHGs, and that stationary sources’ emissions of GHGs cannot 
alone trigger the CAA’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration6 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2016, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; M.S.W., Adelphi 
University; B.A. Sociology, St. Joseph’s College.  I would like to thank Professor Sarah Ad-
ams-Schoen for her guidance and support, and Alyssa Wanser for her advice and assistance 
throughout the editing process.  Most importantly, I thank my family. 
1 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
2 GHGs are gases that trap heat in the atmosphere.  They include carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases.  Carbon dioxide enters the atmosphere by the burning of 
fossil fuels, trees, and also as a byproduct of some chemical reactions.  See Overview of 
Greenhouse Gases, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases.html (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
3 42 U.S.C. § § 7401-7515 (2014). 
4 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2438. 
5 Id. at 2438-42. 
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (providing that “each applicable implementation plan shall contain 
emission limitations . . . to prevent significant deterioration of air quality in each region (or 
portion thereof) designated pursuant to section 7407 of this title as attainment or unclassifia-
ble.”).  Title V imposes both permitting and reporting requirements, but does not include any 
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(“PSD”) program or Title V permitting requirements.7  The Court 
based this determination upon its interpretation of the term “any air 
pollutant” and whether that term should be inclusive of GHGs under 
the PSD provision and Title V permitting requirements of the CAA.8  
The Court further held that the EPA acted impermissibly in promul-
gating the Tailoring Rule,9 which adjusted numerical threshold limi-
tations in order to provide more practical limits for GHG emissions.10  
In its analysis, the Court examined the bounds of the EPA’s authority 
under the CAA based upon both the statutory language and the 
EPA’s regulatory history under the CAA.11 
Arguably, the Court used a results-driven analysis, as it rede-
fined the term “any air pollutant” solely for the PSD provision and 
Title V, and determined that GHGs should not be included.  Moreo-
ver, the Court, by invalidating the Tailoring Rule, effectively stated 
that the EPA is limited in its authority to regulate GHGs under the 
CAA, despite knowledge of the dangers of GHG emissions to public 
health and welfare.12  This Comment will compare and contrast the 
Court’s reasoning in UARG with its reasoning in previous GHG cas-
es, and argue that the PSD provision and Title V permitting require-
ments should be inclusive of GHGs.  Section II will introduce the 
pertinent provisions of the CAA, and offer some history of its inter-
pretation by the EPA and the Supreme Court.  Section III will pro-
vide a summary of the Court’s decision in UARG as well as an analy-
sis of the Court’s decision, and show how the UARG decision 
digresses from the Congressional intent behind the CAA as well as 
the Supreme Court’s past decisions concerning the EPA’s regulation 
of GHGs under the Act. 
II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND THE EPA’S REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY 
Although this Comment centers on the Court’s decision in 
 
substantive limitations on emissions.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2014). 
7 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
8 Id. at 2439-40. 
9 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule]. 
10 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2446. 
11 Id. at 2445. 
12 Id. at 2446. 
2
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UARG, the case cannot be understood without an understanding of 
the general background of the CAA and the provisions pertinent to 
the UARG decision.  The CAA is a federal law designed to address 
air pollution by requiring comprehensive state and federal regulation 
for industrial and mobile sources of air pollution.13  The Act “regu-
lates pollution-generating emissions from both stationary sources,14 
such as factories and power plants, and moving sources, such as cars, 
trucks, and aircraft.”15  President Lyndon B. Johnson signed it into 
law on December 17, 1963, in order to respond to increasing con-
cerns about air pollution, and the inadequacy of state and local ability 
to regulate.16  The Act has since been amended to protect the public 
from emerging hazards associated with air pollution.17  In 1970, the 
Act was amended to delegate to the EPA the authority to direct the 
air pollution control program in accordance with an objective of pro-
tecting public health, agricultural viability, and natural ecosystems.18  
The EPA was given discretionary authority to promulgate regulations 
that prescribe air quality standards and hold states accountable for 
implementing and enforcing these standards.19 
The 1977 Amendments expanded the Act further, establishing 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for air pollu-
tants that pose known health and environmental risks.20  The Act, as 
amended, requires stationary and mobile sources to comply with var-
ious air quality standards in order to maintain pollution levels at or 
below the applicable NAAQS.21  Furthermore, the 1977 Amendments 
provide for the authority of the EPA to add to this list of pollutants, 
and set the NAAQS at levels it deems necessary to protect human 
 
13 42 U.S.C. § 7401. 
14 The CAA defines stationary source as “any building, structure, facility, or installation 
which emits or may emit any air pollutant.” 42 U.S.C § 7411(a)(3). 
15 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2435. 
16 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What’s Worked; What’s 
Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1585-88 (1991) (discussing tragic incidents 
associated with air pollution, including one in which 200 deaths were attributed to “smog” 
that had engulfed New York City in 1963). 
17 Id. at 1588-91.  The CAA was amended in 1965 to provide for federal control over 
emissions of new automobiles.  It was again amended in 1970 to give the Administrator of 
the EPA the authority to prescribe NAAQS with the primary objective of protecting public 
health. 
18 Id. at 1591. 
19 Id. 
20 42 U.S.C. § 7410; see also UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2435. 
21 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d). 
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health and welfare.22  The EPA has since used the CAA as a means of 
regulating GHG emissions in some contexts due to the increasing 
concern surrounding the effect of these emissions upon public health 
and welfare, which has been approved in several instances by the Su-
preme Court.23  The continued evolution of the Act through numerous 
amendments24 further evidences a Congressional purpose to “protect 
and enhance an invaluable national resource, our clean air.”25 
A. The PSD Provision and Title V Permitting 
Requirements 
The PSD provision of the CAA26 requires certain sources in 
“clean air areas”27 of the country to obtain a permit so that emissions 
of air pollutants can be monitored and regulated, and degradation of 
air quality can be prevented.28  The PSD program was created in or-
der to prevent degradation of acceptable air quality in certain areas, 
so that the air quality in these areas should not be degraded to levels 
below those permitted by CAA standards.29  Pursuant to the Act, a 
permit must be obtained before constructing or modifying any “major 
emitting facility” in an area where PSD applies.30  In order to ensure 
that the ambient air quality in “clean air” areas is maintained, each of 
 
22 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1); Rich Raiders, Comment, How EPA Could Implement a Green-
house Gas NAAQS, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 253-54 (2011). 
23 See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
24 Reitze, supra note 16, at 1587-91. 
25 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  In the section of the 
CAA entitled “Congressional declaration of purpose,” Congress stated that its purpose was 
“to protect public health and welfare from any actual or potential adverse effect which in 
[EPA’s] judgment may reasonably be anticipated to occur from air pollution.”  42 U.S.C. § 
7470(1). 
26 The PSD program was created as a result of the 1972 decision in Sierra Club v. Ruckel-
shaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), in which the district court emphasized the congres-
sional purpose of the CAA to protect and enhance air quality.  Craig N. Oren, Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10 
(1988). 
27 The term “clean air areas” generally refers to regions of the country designated as hav-
ing ambient air quality better than the applicable national primary or secondary ambient air 
quality standard.  42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1). 
28 John-Mark Stensvaag, Preventing Significant Deterioration under the Clean Air Act: 
New Facility Permit Triggers, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,003, 10,006 (2008). 
29 Id. at 10,003-04. 
30 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1). 
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the six pollutants for which the EPA established NAAQS, known as 
“criteria pollutants,” is given a specific numerical threshold that des-
ignates the permissible concentration of the pollutant in the air.  All 
areas within each state are designated as “attainment” (meaning 
“clean air”), “nonattainment” (or “dirty air”), or “unclassifiable” for 
each criteria pollutant, based upon whether they have met the 
NAAQS for each of the six criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide, 
lead, nitrogen oxide, ozone, particle pollution, and sulfur dioxide.31  
Every area of the country meets the NAAQS for at least one of these 
pollutants and thus qualifies as an “attainment” or “clean air” area for 
at least one criteria pollutant.32  Therefore, there is no area in the 
country where PSD does not apply.33 
Title V of the CAA34 sets forth the permitting requirements 
for stationary and mobile sources, and explicitly states that major 
emitting sources must apply for permits.35  Title V permits are gen-
eral operating permits that serve as a single document containing all 
control requirements that apply to a particular source for a particular 
pollutant.36  For example, PSD permitting Best Available Control 
Technology (“BACT”) requirements would be found on a Title V 
permit.  All “major sources” require a Title V permit.37 
Because PSD permitting is both time and labor-intensive, it is 
reserved for larger sources that emit higher levels of air pollutants 
and, as a result, place areas at risk for significant deterioration of air 
quality.38  PSD permits are required to construct or modify the opera-
tions of a “major emitting facility.”39  The sources subject to PSD 
permit obligations include those major emitting facilities that emit, at 
the defined levels, “any air pollutant.”40  A “major emitting facility” 
 
31 42 U.S.C. § 7409. 
32 Stensvaag, supra note 28, at 10,006-08. 
33 Id. 
34 42 U.S.C. § 7661a. 
35 Id.; Meredith Wilensky, The Tailoring Rule: Exemplifying the Vital Role of Regulatory 
Agencies in Environmental Protection, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 449, 458 (2011). 
36 42 U.S.C. §7661a; Wilensky, supra note 35, at 458. 
37 42 U.S.C. § 7661a. 
38 Stensvaag, supra note 28, at 10,007-08. 
39 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1); see also Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal 
of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 
52,676 (1980).  The 1980 rule applied the PSD permitting program to several pollutants for 
which NAAQS had not been promulgated, including asbestos, beryllium, mercury, vinyl 
5
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is defined as any stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons 
per year or 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant,” depending upon 
the type of source.41  This definition is not specific to any one pollu-
tant, but refers to sources that emit quantities of any air pollutant that 
exceeds the statutory threshold.42 
Finally, in order to satisfy the PSD permitting requirements, 
the source must comply with the BACT provision for each pollutant 
subject to regulation under the Act, and utilize the best technology, 
processes, and techniques available for reducing pollution emitted by 
the applicant’s facility.43  Both new and modified stationary sources 
must install technologies in compliance with BACT in order to con-
trol significant emissions of any regulated pollutant.44  Existing, un-
modified sources that significantly increase their emissions of “any 
air pollutant” are also subject to BACT.45 
The EPA’s definition of “stationary source” within the PSD 
provision was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council.46  In Chevron, petitioners filed 
for review of the EPA’s definition of “stationary source” under the 
CAA.47  As the CAA required nonattainment states to regulate “new 
or modified stationary sources,”48 the EPA used a definition of “sta-
tionary source” that referred to either a power plant as a whole, or 
 
chloride, fluorides, sulfuric acid, total reduced sulfur/reduced sulfur, hydrogen sulfide, me-
thyl mercaptan, dimethyl sulfide, dimethyl disulfide, carbon disulfide, and carbonyl sulfide.  
Five non-NAAQS pollutants (fluorides, sulfuric acid mist, hydrogen sulfide, total reduced 
sulfur, and reduced sulfur compounds) have been subject to the PSD program since the 
EPA’s 1980 rule applied PSD to all regulated pollutants.  Id. at 52,708-09. 
41 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1); see also Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 352. 
42 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).  The BACT provision provides: 
The term “best available control technology” means an emission limita-
tion based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject 
to regulation under this chapter emitted from or which results from any 
major emitting facility . . . through application of production processes 
and available methods . . . for control of each such pollutant. 
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 7475. 
45 Id.  In order to determine BACT, the EPA must identify which emissions control tech-
nologies are available.  The available options are ranked by control and cost effectiveness in 
order to determine the appropriate BACT.  See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,520. 
46 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
47 Id. at 840. 
48 42 U.S.C. § 7502. 
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smaller units within the plant.49  The Court permitted the EPA to use 
this definition, recognizing that Congress had conferred authority up-
on the EPA to regulate air pollution under the CAA.50  The Court rea-
soned that the EPA’s definition of the term was “a permissible con-
struction of the statute which seeks to accommodate progress in 
reducing air pollution with economic growth.”51  According to Chev-
ron, when a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to an issue, 
courts must defer to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpreta-
tion of the statute.52  The Court in Chevron set the precedent of high 
deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the ambiguous terms of the 
CAA. 
B. The CAA as a Platform for Regulating GHGs 
The EPA has used the Act as a platform for regulating GHGs, 
as scientific research has demonstrated their harmful effects on hu-
mans and the environment.53  In 2009, the EPA announced its finding 
that GHGs emitted by motor vehicles are the greatest cause of “hu-
man-induced climate change,” and that this poses a danger to public 
health and welfare.54  This determination is known as the “Endan-
germent Finding,” which triggers the EPA’s duty to regulate GHGs 
under the CAA.55  In Massachusetts v. EPA,56 a group of organiza-
tions petitioned the EPA to regulate motor vehicle emissions of 
GHGs under the Act.57  The EPA argued that it lacked authority to 
address climate change through the CAA and that regulation at that 
time would be unwise.58  The Supreme Court held that GHG emis-
 
49 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
50 Id. at 866. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 843-44. 
53 See Tailpipe Rule: Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy Standards Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) [here-
inafter Tailpipe Rule]. 
54 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Endangerment 
Finding]. 
55 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533-34; Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,4976. 
56 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
57 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 513. 
58 Id.  The EPA claimed that it would be unwise because of lack of certainty of science 
and because it might “hamper the President's ability to persuade key developing countries to 
reduce [GHG] emissions.”  Id. at 513-14. 
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sions from motor vehicles could each be characterized as an “air pol-
lutant” under the CAA so long as the EPA had first determined that 
these emissions were a threat to human health and to the environ-
ment.59  Massachusetts established that carbon dioxide, which is 
known as the most prevalent and harmful GHG, is an “air pollutant” 
under § 7602(g) of the Act, which section defines “air pollutant” for 
the NAAQS program.60  In Massachusetts, the Court emphasized that 
“without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific 
developments would soon render the [CAA] obsolete.”61  Massachu-
setts also emphasized the EPA’s duty to protect the health and wel-
fare of the public.62  Furthermore, despite a high level of deference to 
the EPA’s discretion, the Court in Massachusetts found that the EPA 
was mandated to regulate GHG emissions as failing to regulate “pre-
sents a risk of harm . . . that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’ ”63  The 
Court further asserted its position that the harms associated with 
global warming are “serious and well recognized.”64 
Because the CAA conferred authority on the EPA to regulate 
threats to the environment, as well as human health and safety, the 
Court held that the EPA was required to address these concerns by 
 
59 Id. at 533. 
60 Daniel Brian, Regulating Carbon Dioxide under the Clean Air Act as a Hazardous Air 
Pollutant, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 369, 378 (2008); 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) defines “air pollu-
tant” as: 
[A]ny air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any 
physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material, 
special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter 
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air. Such term in-
cludes any precursors to the formation of any air pollutant, to the extent 
the Administrator has identified such precursor or precursors for the par-
ticular purpose for which the term “air pollutant” is used. 
Id. 
61 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 521. 
64 Id.; see Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining 
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2009): 
As [GHG] emissions continue to increase, exponentially larger, and po-
tentially more economically disruptive, emissions reductions will be 
necessary in the future to bring atmospheric concentrations down to de-
sired levels. Future technological advances, therefore, would likewise 
have to be able to achieve those exponentially greater reductions to make 
up for lost time. 
Id. 
8
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promulgating regulations under the CAA.65  In Massachusetts, the 
Court recognized that the CAA’s drafters “might not have appreciat-
ed the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warm-
ing.”66  In that case, the Court concluded that the broad language of 
the CAA indicates Congress’s intent to confer flexibility in interpre-
tation.67  The Court further emphasized that the EPA is mandated to 
regulate “any air pollutant” that presents a danger to public welfare.68  
Massachusetts established the EPA’s duty to regulate GHGs if it de-
termines that they are harmful, and that the EPA can no longer refuse 
to act, unless it can support its inaction in the language of the CAA.69  
In fact, in Massachusetts, the Court determined that the EPA is obli-
gated to regulate GHG emissions from mobile sources under the 
CAA if it makes an Endangerment Finding, or otherwise render the 
CAA obsolete.70  The Court stated that the EPA has a responsibility 
to regulate emission of GHGs to try and slow global warming, in-
cluding regulations of both mobile and stationary sources.71  As a re-
sult of the Endangerment Finding,72 the EPA began regulating GHGs 
for mobile sources (the type of sources at issue in Massachusetts).73 
The Supreme Court again addressed the EPA’s regulation of 
GHGs under the Act in American Electric, in which plaintiffs sued 
electric companies that operated power plants in twenty states based 
 
65 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
66 Id. at 532. 
67 Id.; see also Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002) 
(noting the expansive meaning of the word “any” as “one or some indiscriminately of what-
ever kind” (internal quotations omitted)). 
68 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
69 Id. 
Under the clear terms of the [CAA], [the] EPA can avoid taking further 
action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to 
climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it 
cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do. 
70 Id. at 532-33 (noting that even if Congress did not foresee global warming, it surely ap-
preciated the need for regulatory flexibility in order to adapt to changing circumstances and 
scientific developments in the area of air pollution). 
71 Id. at 528-29. 
72 Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,497 (“[T]he Administrator finds that green-
house gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public health 
and to endanger public welfare. . . .  The Administrator has determined that the body of sci-
entific evidence compellingly supports this finding.”). 
73 See Tailpipe Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,324. 
9
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upon the “public nuisance” doctrine as applied to GHG emissions.74  
The Court refused to allow these claims, determining that the EPA 
regulations on GHG emissions displaced any public nuisance claim.75  
In American Electric, the EPA was given deference as the expert in 
the area of climate change risks, and the defendants were determined 
to be legally operating within those limits.76  The Court plainly stated 
that “emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to 
regulation under the [CAA].”77  The CAA “entrusts such complex 
balancing to [the] EPA in the first instance, in combination with state 
regulators.”78  The Court’s decision in American Electric unequivo-
cally supported the authority of the EPA to regulate GHGs, by way of 
the reasoning in Chevron and Massachusetts. 
C. The Tailoring Rule Provided Workable Threshold 
Limits for GHGs for the PSD Program 
Massachusetts made clear that GHGs are “air pollutants” un-
der the Act, and that, as such, the EPA has a responsibility to regulate 
them if an Endangerment Finding is made.79  Thus, after making its 
Endangerment Finding for GHGs,80 the EPA responded by enacting 
the Tailoring Rule,81 a regulation that provided workable threshold 
limits for GHGs under PSD.82  Because GHGs are emitted at much 
higher concentrations than other air pollutants,83 the result of the PSD 
threshold limits is that smaller sources like small businesses, hospi-
tals, and apartment buildings, would be required to apply for a permit 
under the PSD program, thus dramatically expanding the scope of the 
 
74 Am. Elec., 131 S. Ct. at 2532. 
75 Id. at 2540. 
76 Id. at 2539. 
77 Id. at 2537 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-29). 
78 Id. at 2539-40 (emphasizing that because Congress designated the EPA as the expert 
agency to make determinations regarding GHGs, it is not within the authority of federal 
judges, who lack the scientific resources and expertise, to determine what amount of GHG 
emissions is “reasonable” and what level of reduction is feasible). 
79 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
80 Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,496. 
81 Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,514. 
82 Id. 
83 Matthew R. Oakes, Questioning the Use of Structure to Interpret Statutory Intent: A 
Critique of Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 124 YALE L.J. F. 56, 56 (2014). 
10
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program.84  In order to avoid the PSD’s numerical threshold limits 
becoming unworkable for GHGs, the EPA developed the Tailoring 
Rule.85  The Tailoring Rule was issued in May 2010 in order to im-
plement PSD and Title V permitting requirements for GHG emis-
sions in phases, and to adapt the requirements in order to meaningful-
ly regulate GHGs.86  To do so, the EPA relied upon its authority 
under § 7601, which authorizes the EPA to “prescribe such regula-
tions as are necessary to carry out [its] functions under [the CAA].”87 
Under the Tailoring Rule, the EPA adjusted the threshold re-
quirements under the CAA so that only major emitting sources or 
those sources that emit GHGs at the highest levels must seek a permit 
pursuant to PSD, so as to not affect small businesses, hospitals, and 
the like.88  Particularly, the Tailoring Rule changed the threshold lim-
its for GHGs from 100 and 250 tons per year depending on the type 
of source, to 75,000 and 100,000 tons per year depending on the type 
of source.89  The tailored thresholds limit the PSD permitting re-
quirement to only those major sources that emit very large quantities 
of GHGs.  The EPA focused on those industrial sources responsible 
for 70 percent of the GHG pollution from stationary sources, while 
reserving some discretion for the EPA to identify the most cost-
effective emissions control options for major emitting sources.90  This 
tailoring was consistent with Congress’s intent to subject only larger 
emitting facilities to PSD and Title V permitting requirements.91 
In enacting the Tailoring Rule, the EPA relied upon the rea-
soning of the D.C. Circuit in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,92 which 
invoked the “absurd results doctrine,” as well as the “administrative 
necessity doctrine,” in order to adapt the PSD numerical thresholds to 
GHG emissions.93  In Alabama Power, the D.C. Circuit determined 
 
84 Id. at 56 (noting that “regulating GHG emissions at the levels apparently required by 
the CAA would have increased the number of permitted sources at least a hundredfold”). 
85 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2437. 
86 Id. 
87 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1). 
88 Wilensky, supra note 35, at 459. 
89 Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. 
90 See Clean Air Act Permitting for Greenhouse Gases: Guidance and Technical Infor-
mation Fact Sheet, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ghgdocs/ghgpermittingtoolsfs.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 7, 2014). 
91 Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. 
92 636 F.2d 323 (1979). 
93 Raiders, supra note 22, at 250. 
11
Curley: The Clean Air Act
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
600 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
 
that the EPA must abide by statutory language unless its literal terms 
would lead to absurd results.94  The “absurd results doctrine” thus au-
thorizes agencies such as the EPA to apply statutory requirements 
differently from the literal meaning, if necessary, to avoid absurd or 
futile results that are at odds with the purpose of the legislation.95  
The court in Alabama Power also acknowledged the agency’s need 
for flexibility in determining when interpretations that depart from 
the literal text of the statute are administratively necessary.96  The 
court further supported this finding with the “administrative necessity 
doctrine,” which permits agencies to avoid the impossibilities of ap-
plying statutory requirements in certain circumstances.97  As a result, 
the court sustained the EPA’s decision to excuse certain sources from 
PSD review in order to avoid the absurd results that would ensue 
from a literal interpretation of the statute.98 
The EPA recognized that the application of the numerical 
threshold limits of 100 and 250 tons per year for “major sources” 
would be “absurd” if applied to GHGs because the PSD program’s 
requirements would apply to sources for which the regulatory scheme 
was not at all intended, such as sources as small as large single-
family homes.99  In response to the dilemma created by the Supreme 
Court’s insistence in Massachusetts that air pollutants include GHGs, 
together with the practical difficulties that would result from utilizing 
the existing 100 and 250 tons per year thresholds, the EPA promul-
gated the Tailoring Rule, adjusting the threshold limits to meaning-
fully regulate GHGs and adopted a phase-in approach to the GHG 
regulations in order to prevent the “absurd results” that would ensue 
if the PSD program requirement were immediately applied to all sta-
tionary sources that emit GHGs at quantities above the statutory 
thresholds.100  The EPA determined that it was administratively nec-
 
94 Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 353 (emphasizing the importance of Congressional intent 
for interpreting language within the CAA). 
95 Id. at 411 n.89. 
96 Raiders, supra note 22, at 250; see also Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 357. 
97 Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 361; see also Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 636 F.2d 
1267, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
98 Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 361-62 (finding that PSD permitting requirements are 
triggered by NAAQS and any other pollutants regulated under CAA). 
99 Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,533. 
100 Id.  “[A]bsurd results” would ensue if the PSD and Title V programs’ requirements 
were immediately applied to all stationary sources emitting GHGs in amounts above the 
statutory thresholds.  To avoid these consequences, the EPA prescribed higher thresholds for 
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essary to adapt the numerical PSD thresholds to levels that were 
meaningful for GHG emissions in order to avoid such unduly burden-
some results.  Thus, the Tailoring Rule was an attempt to preserve the 
Congressional intent of maintaining safe levels of air pollutants that 
are known to endanger public health and welfare.101 
III. UARG AND THE COURT’S ABRUPT LIMITATION ON THE 
EPA’S AUTHORITY UNDER THE CAA 
In UARG, petitioners challenged the EPA’s authority to regu-
late GHGs under the PSD provision, which required certain GHG-
emitting sources to obtain permits.102  UARG concerned the permit-
ting requirements for stationary sources under the PSD and Title V 
provisions, as well as whether those sources were subject to the PSD 
program’s BACT provision.103  The Court examined the language of 
these provisions in order to determine whether the EPA acted within 
the scope of its authority by concluding that the PSD program and Ti-
tle V applied to GHGs, and implementing the Tailoring Rule to limit 
the number of smaller sources required to obtain PSD permits and 
thus become subject to the BACT provision.104  The Court’s decision 
turned on the definition of “any air pollutant” within the PSD provi-
sion as well as within the Act as a whole.105  The Court emphasized 
the importance of a reasonable statutory interpretation, and relied up-
on its past decisions in Chevron and Massachusetts, which set forth 
the framework for EPA authority under the CAA, to reach its conclu-
sion.106 
The decision, written by Justice Scalia, consisted of three dis-
tinct holdings, which will be addressed in turn.  First, the Court held 
that stationary sources could not be subject to PSD permitting re-
 
GHGs, so that only the largest sources are affected. 
101 Wilensky, supra note 35, at 474.  “If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory 
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that 
intention is the law and must be given effect.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 n.9. 
102 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439-40. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 2439-40, 2444-45; see supra Section II.A (discussing PSD program and BACT). 
105 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2441-42 (observing that the EPA is not bound by the Act-wide 
definition of “air pollutant” when interpreting operative provisions of the Act such as the 
PSD provision.  In the Court’s view, the inclusion of GHGs in the definition of “any air pol-
lutant” in this case would be incompatible with the program). 
106 See generally UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427. 
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quirements based upon their potential to emit GHGs.107  The Court 
determined that the phrase “any air pollutant” within the PSD provi-
sion, used when describing the pollutants that trigger PSD and Title 
V, did not include GHGs.108  Second, the Court found that the EPA 
exceeded its authority when it adjusted the numerical limitations on 
emissions from 100 and 250 tons per year to 75,000 and 100,000 tons 
per year for GHGs in order to adapt the provision to workable levels 
for GHGs.109  The Court reasoned that the numerical limits in the Act 
were unambiguous and provided no room for interpretation by the 
agency.110  Finally, the Court held that the EPA’s interpretation of the 
phrase “each pollutant subject to regulation under [the Act]”111 in the 
PSD program’s BACT provision as including GHGs was a reasona-
ble construction of the Act.112  Overall, under UARG, the EPA does 
not have authority to regulate GHGs under Title V and PSD in clean 
air areas, while sources that emit the threshold level of GHGs that are 
already subject to PSD permitting requirements must comply with 
BACT. 
A. The Court in UARG Held That the Term “Any Air 
Pollutant” within the PSD Provision and Title V 
Implicitly Excludes GHGs 
The Court in UARG determined that the phrase “any air pollu-
tant” does not include GHGs within the PSD provision and Title V.113  
This determination was made despite the plain language of the stat-
ute, and does not appear to conform with Congress’s intent or the 
Court’s previous mandate that the EPA take action if an Endanger-
ment Finding is made.114  The CAA defines “air pollutant” as “any air 
pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physi-
cal, chemical, biological [or] radioactive substance . . . or matter 
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”115  The 
 
107 Id. at 2442. 
108 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1); UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
109 Id. at 2445. 
110 Id. at 2427. 
111 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). 
112 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2449. 
113 Id. at 2442. 
114 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
115 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). 
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Court in Massachusetts affirmatively stated that GHGs are “air pollu-
tants” subject to the Act.116  The PSD permit requirement applies to 
major sources that emit “any air pollutant” at the defined levels.117  
Historically, the EPA has interpreted PSD to apply to sources emit-
ting any regulated air pollutant, even those for which it had not 
promulgated NAAQS.118  However, the Court in UARG determined 
that the EPA can no longer interpret the language “any air pollutant” 
as inclusive of GHGs.119  The Court, in making this determination, 
disregarded the plain language of the statute, namely, the word 
“any,”120 as well as the Court’s prior holding that it is the EPA’s re-
sponsibility to act upon an Endangerment Finding with regard to 
sources emitting GHGs.121 
The Court relied upon Chevron to support this finding, rea-
soning that Congress did not intend for an expansion of the EPA’s 
authority that would impact so many small sources as well as the 
economy as a whole.122  However, according to the Court in Chevron, 
the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA is subject to deference when the 
statute is ambiguous or silent with regard to the issue, and the agen-
cy’s interpretation is reasonable within the purpose of the statute.123  
Thus, the “permissible construction” approach of Chevron requires 
deference to the administrative agency’s (in this case, the EPA’s) rea-
sonable construction of the statute when the statute is ambiguous, and 
neither requires nor permits an evaluation of whether there are possi-
ble consequences of the agency’s statutory interpretation.124  As the 
Court in Chevron first explained, when Congress has not spoken di-
rectly to the issue and an administrative agency has addressed Con-
gress’s silence, “the court [cannot] simply impose its own construc-
tion [of] the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an 
 
116 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
117 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). 
118 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
119 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2441. 
120 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (subjecting “stationary sources of air pollutants which emit, or 
have the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant” to PSD 
requirements). 
121 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
122 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2442-43. 
123 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
124 Id. at 866 n.20 (citing Emissions Offset Interpretative Ruling, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524, 
55,527 (1976) (“[T]he Act does not allow economic growth to be accommodated at the ex-
pense of the public health.”)). 
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administrative interpretation.”125 
The Court in UARG treated the term “any air pollutant” as 
ambiguous in its analysis, asserting that inclusion of GHGs in this 
term would be inconsistent with the statute as a whole.126  Presuming 
that Congress had not spoken directly to the question at issue, the 
Court then determined that the EPA’s inclusion of GHGs under the 
PSD requirement was not a reasonable interpretation of the statute, 
but yet it found that the inclusion of GHGs under the BACT provi-
sion was a reasonable construction of the statute.127  The Court’s 
reading of the term “any air pollutant” as excluding GHGs seems to 
defy all logic, particularly when the Court had explicitly recognized 
GHGs as an air pollutant for the purposes of the Act in Massachu-
setts.128  By holding that the EPA’s interpretation of the term “any air 
pollutant” was unreasonable, the Court imposed its own interpreta-
tion that excludes GHGs. 
In UARG, the Court shifted its focus from the text of the Act, 
emphasizing that a reasonable statutory interpretation under Chevron 
must account for both the specific context of the provision as well as 
the Act-wide context.129  The Court noted that the EPA has given “air 
pollutant” a narrower meaning in the context of specific operative 
provisions of the CAA.130  Particularly, the EPA has previously inter-
preted “air pollutant” within the PSD program as limited to only reg-
ulated air pollutants.131  The Court in UARG determined that the term 
“air pollutant” in this context includes a narrower subset of airborne 
compounds that do not include GHGs because, although the Act-wide 
definition includes GHGs, the specific context of the provision ap-
plies only to a narrower class of “regulated” pollutants.132  Interest-
ingly, the Court relied on the EPA’s past regulations to form this 
conclusion rather than evaluating the plain language of the statute 
along with Congressional intent.133  The Court also reasoned that, as a 
practical matter, PSD cannot apply to “any” air pollutant regulated by 
 
125 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
126 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2441. 
127 Id. at 2448. 
128 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-29. 
129 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2442. 
130 Id. at 2439. 
131 Id. at 2439-40. 
132 Id. at 2440. 
133 Id. 
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the CAA, but only those pollutants that the EPA can workably regu-
late under the PSD program without adjusting the numerical thresh-
old limits.134  For these reasons, the Court determined that PSD did 
not apply to GHGs, and that the EPA had overstepped its authority.135 
The Court in UARG referenced Chevron to support its deter-
minations that the EPA acted impermissibly with respect to the PSD 
program triggering provision and permissibly with respect to the 
BACT provision,136 when in fact, this reasoning does not comport 
with Chevron’s command of deference to the EPA,137 or with the 
Court’s prior holding in Massachusetts.138  In Massachusetts, the 
Court held that the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” encom-
passed “all airborne compounds of whatever stripe.”139  However, be-
cause the EPA has previously interpreted the PSD permitting trigger 
language “any air pollutant” to include only regulated air pollutants, 
the Court in UARG determined that the PSD provision can apply only 
to a “narrower, context-appropriate” subset, which does not include 
GHGs.140 
The Court in UARG failed to acknowledge that the EPA’s 
course of conduct was in direct response to the Court’s finding in 
Massachusetts that the words “air pollutant” in § 202(a)(1) includes 
carbon dioxide.141  The Court in Massachusetts rejected a variety of 
efforts by the EPA to exempt GHGs from the plain language of the 
CAA.142  It held that GHGs are “air pollutants” within the meaning of 
the Act and that their unique characteristics or the possible economic 
and administrative consequences of regulation were not a basis upon 
which to avoid the CAA’s requirements.143 
 
134 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2445. 
135 Id. at 2449. 
136 Id. 
137 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
138 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
139 Id. at 528-29; 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).  Congress typically uses the “expansive” word 
“any” to further broaden the application of a given definition.  United States v. Gonzalez, 
520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997). 
140 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439. 
141 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-29. 
142 Id. at 533 (suggesting that even a “laundry list of reasons not to regulate” has nothing 
to do with whether GHG emissions contribute to global climate change, and does not support 
noncompliance with the CAA’s clear statutory commands). 
143 Id. at 534-35; see also Am. Elec., 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (explaining that “emissions of car-
bon dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to regulation under the [CAA]”). 
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Furthermore, the Court in Massachusetts explained that the 
EPA need not “resolve massive problems” like GHG emissions “in 
one fell regulatory swoop.”144  Instead, it continued, the EPA may 
“whittle away at them over time, refining [its] preferred approach as 
circumstances change and as [the EPA] develops a more nuanced un-
derstanding of how best to proceed.”145  The Court in UARG attempt-
ed to reconcile its conclusion with the holding in Massachusetts by 
drawing a distinction between the “[a]ct-wide definition” and the def-
inition used for specific provisions.146 
As a result, the Court in UARG impermissibly substituted its 
own judgment in place of the EPA’s judgment, in contravention of its 
prior holdings in both Chevron and Massachusetts.  This apparent in-
consistency in reasoning suggests that the EPA’s authority to apply 
various provisions of the CAA to GHG emissions is subject to case-
by-case determinations made by the courts.  Arguably, this approach 
to the Act is significantly less efficient and clear than the EPA’s solu-
tion, as it may lead to continued case-by-case determinations of 
whether the EPA may regulate GHGs throughout operative provi-
sions of the Act. 
The Court impermissibly evaluated the potential administra-
tive and economic impact of including GHGs in the term “any air 
pollutant” in order to conclude that the EPA may not regulate GHGs 
under PSD and Title V.  Such an analysis is not permitted by the 
plain text of the Act, nor by the Court’s prior holding in Massachu-
setts.147  Acknowledging its departure from the plain meaning of the 
phrase “any air pollutant,” the Supreme Court in UARG made the as-
sertion that the regulation of GHGs under PSD and Title V would be 
inconsistent with the design and structure of the CAA.148  The Court 
reasoned that the administrative and economic costs of regulation 
suggest that the EPA’s view cannot be a “reasonable construction” of 
the Act.149  The Court used a results-driven analysis to conclude that 
the application of PSD and Title V permitting to sources emitting 
GHGs would result in “plainly excessive demands on limited gov-
 
144 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524. 
145 Id. 
146 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439-40. 
147 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
148 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2442. 
149 Id. 
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ernmental resources” and expand the EPA’s authority beyond Con-
gress’s intent.150 
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion asserted that the majority 
created “an atextual greenhouse gas exception to the phrase ‘any air 
pollutant.’ ”151  Indeed, it appears as though the term “any air pollu-
tant” would be inclusive of GHGs by virtue of the word “any.”  Al-
though the Court acknowledged that the EPA’s interpretation of the 
phrase is “plausible,” the Court concluded that the results would be 
unreasonable, as they would require a great number of small sources 
to obtain permits.152  While the Court need not exclude GHGs from 
the set of “any air pollutant,” neither the Court nor the EPA could 
fathom the application of the existing numerical threshold limits to 
GHGs because of the number of sources that would be required to 
obtain a permit.153  The Court resolved this concern by concluding 
that GHGs are not “air pollutants” for the purpose of the PSD provi-
sion.154  The EPA resolved this concern by enacting the Tailoring 
Rule, which is discussed below. 
B. The Court in UARG Held that the EPA Exceeded 
Its Authority by Enacting the Tailoring Rule 
As for its second holding, the Court determined that the EPA 
exceeded its authority by enacting the Tailoring Rule.155  Unlike the 
first holding, in this portion of the opinion, the Court championed ad-
herence to the plain text of the statute.156  Specifically, the Court 
found that the EPA exceeded its authority when it adjusted the nu-
merical limitations for PSD and Title V permitting to provide mean-
ingful limits for GHGs.157  Denouncing the Tailoring Rule for its de-
parture from the plain language of the Act,158 the Court, instead of 
 
150 Id. at 2444. 
151 Id. at 2452 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
152 Id. at 2446. 
153 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2442-43 (“[A]nnual permit applications would jump from about 
800 to nearly 82,000; annual administrative costs would swell from $12 million to over $1.5 
billion; and decade-long delays in issuing permits would become common, causing construc-
tion projects to grind to a halt nationwide.”). 
154 Id. at 2444. 
155 Id. at 2445-46. 
156 Id. at 2444-45. 
157 Id. at 2442. 
158 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
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acknowledging the inherent inconsistency in the Act between the 
terms “any air pollutant” and the numerical threshold limits provided 
by the PSD provision, invalidated the Tailoring Rule.159 
The Court ruled that because the EPA is not permitted to “re-
write clear statutory terms,” the EPA’s promulgation of the Tailoring 
Rule was not entitled to Chevron deference.160  However, the Court 
failed to consider Congress’s silence with respect to threshold limits 
that could workably apply to GHGs.  Since PSD’s numerical thresh-
old limits cannot feasibly be applied to GHG-emitting sources (a 
point agreed upon by both the Court and the EPA), and the Act does 
not specifically mention GHGs, at least arguably, it can be presumed 
that the CAA is silent or ambiguous with respect to threshold limits 
for GHGs.  Thus, pursuant to Chevron, in such cases when Congress 
is silent or leaves ambiguity in a statute, courts must defer to the ad-
ministrative agency’s reasonable interpretation.  But here, rather than 
deferring to the agency’s interpretation, the Court held that the EPA 
had no authority to tailor the numerical requirements for GHGs.161 
Presuming the CAA is indeed ambiguous with respect to nu-
merical threshold limits for GHGs, the EPA would be authorized to 
make a reasonable construction of the statute under Chevron.  The 
Tailoring Rule was an attempt to reconcile the “any air pollutant” 
language of the PSD provision and Title V with the statutory thresh-
old limits for air pollutants.  The Court could have permitted the 
EPA’s promulgation of the Tailoring Rule in this respect, as it was an 
attempt to resolve a statutory inconsistency while complying with 
Congress’s intent.162 
Instead, this holding diverged from the Massachusetts man-
date that the EPA has liberal discretion with regard to the regulation 
of harmful pollutants if they place public health and welfare at risk.163  
Rather than compelling the EPA to act upon its Endangerment Find-
ing, the Court prohibited the EPA from requiring PSD permits for 
sources emitting 100,000 tons a year of GHGs.164  By refusing to al-
low the EPA to exercise its duty to address quantities of GHGs emit-
 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 2446. 
161 Id. 
162 42 U.S.C. §7470(1); Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,533. 
163 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2446; see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
164 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
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ted by major sources, the Court prevented the EPA from abiding by 
the rule in Massachusetts that the EPA must act when it perceives a 
danger to public health and safety.165 
Moreover, Justice Scalia, writing the majority opinion, failed 
to acknowledge in UARG an important and relevant holding in Mas-
sachusetts: the EPA cannot avoid an Endangerment Finding based on 
its belief that regulating GHGs would be overly burdensome, and, if 
the EPA finds that GHGs pose a danger (i.e., makes an Endanger-
ment Finding), the agency must regulate them.166  This omission 
permits a presumption that the EPA acted unreasonably in promulgat-
ing the Tailoring Rule, whereas the EPA was actually doing precisely 
what the Court in Massachusetts directed.  Arguably, the EPA ad-
dressed the conflict posed by GHG emissions and the statutory 
threshold limits as efficiently as possible under the CAA’s terms and 
pursuant to the authority delegated by Congress when it implemented 
the Tailoring Rule.167  When an agency faces conflicting statutory 
commands, it “may deviate no further from the statute than is needed 
to protect congressional intent.”168  The EPA’s interpretation was ar-
guably fully consistent with its authority as well as the Congressional 
intent behind the CAA. 
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, pointed out that Congress’s in-
tent underlying the 250 tons per year threshold was to limit PSD’s 
obligations to larger sources rather than imposing regulatory burdens 
upon smaller sources.169  The EPA’s interpretation acknowledged this 
concern by promulgating the Tailoring Rule, which exempted the 
smaller GHG emitting sources in order to avoid placing undue ad-
ministrative burdens upon sources which Congress never intended to 
apply to permits.170  Therefore, not only was the EPA’s definition 
plausible, it was directly aligned with the Congressional intent in two 
respects: (1) to subject only larger sources with greater ability to bear 
the burden of permitting requirements to the PSD requirements171 and 
(2) for the EPA to take action to protect public health and welfare by 
 
165 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
166 Id. 
167 See generally Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514. 
168 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
169 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2450-51 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
170 Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 32,533. 
171 Id. 
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regulating GHG emissions.172 
The Court’s adherence to the plain language of PSD for the 
purpose of invalidating the Tailoring Rule,173 just after holding that 
GHGs should be excluded from the PSD provision category of “any 
air pollutant,” obviates the flawed reasoning in this opinion.174  The 
effect of GHG emissions is a pressing concern of both Congress and 
the EPA.175  The legislative intent behind the CAA bestows upon the 
EPA the authority to interpret and construct the CAA in order to pro-
tect public health and welfare.176  Furthermore, the EPA carried out 
the PSD and Title V permitting programs in a manner that contem-
plated both expressed congressional objectives and prior holdings of 
the Supreme Court, as well as the practical realities of implementa-
tion.177  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court invalidated the Tailoring 
Rule in UARG. 
C. The Court in UARG Held that the Term “Any Air 
Pollutant Subject to Regulation under This 
Chapter” within the BACT Provision Includes 
GHGs 
The Court’s determination that the language subjecting “any 
pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter” to BACT is inclu-
sive of GHGs, while also finding that the broader term subjecting 
“any air pollutant” to the PSD provision is not inclusive of GHGs, is 
counterintuitive.178  The Court stated that the EPA went too far when 
it determined that the term “any air pollutant” is inclusive of GHGs 
under the PSD provision.179  The Court reasoned that the implications 
of the EPA’s proposed definition would be unreasonable and there-
fore impermissible.180  Nevertheless, the Court determined that “any-
 
172 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a).  Congress specifically contemplates “major emitting facilit[ies]” 
as subject to PSD requirements.  See id. 
173 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
174 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
175 Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,497. 
176 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
177 Id. 
178 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
179 Id. 
180 “[T]he dubious breadth of ‘any air pollutant’ in the permitting triggers suggests a role 
for agency judgment in identifying the subset of pollutants covered by the particular regula-
tory program at issue.”  UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448. 
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way sources,” or sources that would be required to obtain PSD per-
mits “anyway” based upon their emissions of pollutants other than 
GHGs, must comply with BACT emission standards for GHGs.181  
The language of the provision dictates that BACT applies to “any 
pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter.”182  The Court 
viewed this language as “far less open-ended” than the “any air pollu-
tant” language of PSD and Title V.183 
The Court ruled that GHG emissions can be subject to the 
BACT provision, and yet cannot be subject to PSD, when the lan-
guage indicates that emissions of “any air pollutant” are regulated.184  
The Court supported its holding that “anyway” sources emitting 
GHGs are subject to BACT, while at the same time holding that 
GHGs cannot trigger PSD reasoning that “applying BACT to [GHGs] 
is not so disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a dra-
matic expansion of agency authority.”185  The language of the provi-
sion dictates that BACT applies to “any pollutant subject to regula-
tion under this chapter.”186  The Court’s manipulation of the statutory 
language failed to show how GHGs do not trigger PSD and yet still 
can be subject to BACT.187  Instead, the Court resorted to an applica-
tion of the Chevron standard of “reasonable interpretation,” and con-
cluded that allowing PSD to apply to GHGs is more unreasonable 
than subjecting GHGs to the BACT provision.188  In doing so, the 
Court ignored the explicit language of “any air pollutant,” which is 
not permitted by Chevron,189 and reached another results-driven con-
clusion. 
The Court clearly and impermissibly substituted its own 
judgment for that of the EPA, the expert agency to which Congress 
delegated the authority to implement and enforce regulations under 
the CAA, in order to make this determination.  As the EPA is explic-
 
181 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448-49. 
182 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). 
183 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448. 
184 Id. at 2449. 
185 Id. at 2448. 
186 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). 
187 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448. 
188 Id. 
189 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864 (noting that it was impermissible for the court to make a dis-
tinction that “may well be a sensible one, but . . . is not a distinction that Congress ever ar-
ticulated itself, or one that the EPA found in the statute”). 
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itly charged by Congress with the authority to interpret the Act, it is 
the Court in this case that overstepped its authority.  The decision in 
UARG is also directly contrary to the Court’s reasoning in Massachu-
setts, in which the Court went so far as to say that the EPA is man-
dated to regulate “any air pollutant” it believes to be a threat.190  The 
Court somehow reasoned that the term “any air pollutant” necessarily 
implicates agency judgment, when the language of BACT implicates 
“each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter,” and when 
Congress has already determined which pollutants are covered.191 
The fact that the Court read “each pollutant subject to regula-
tion in this chapter” more broadly than “any air pollutant” suggests 
that the Court placed undue emphasis on administrative costs at the 
expense of public health.  The resulting conclusion defies logic, as 
GHGs can be regulated by the EPA for sources in clean air areas only 
when that source is already subject to PSD and Title V.  The Court’s 
decision in UARG appears to be founded upon the consideration of 
factors that are not permitted by the plain text of the statute.  The de-
cision was a departure from the Supreme Court’s prior holdings in 
Chevron and Massachusetts, and contravened the clear purpose of the 
CAA to protect both the environment and public health from the 
damaging effects of air pollution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The EPA is the expert agency delegated by Congress with the 
authority to regulate air pollution under the CAA.192  As GHG emis-
sions pose an endangerment to public health and welfare,193 the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged that the EPA must regulate GHGs as 
air pollutants under the CAA.194  The Court clearly stated in Massa-
chusetts that GHGs are air pollutants subject to regulation in the 
Act.195  However, in UARG, the Court used alternative reasoning di-
vorced from the plain meaning of “any air pollutant,” and held that 
this term is not inclusive of GHGs for the purposes of the PSD provi-
 
190 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
191 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2448. 
192 Am. Elec., 131 S. Ct. at 2539-40. 
193 See generally Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496. 
194 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
195 Id. at 527-28. 
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 3, Art. 17
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss3/17
2015 THE CLEAN AIR ACT 613 
 
sion and Title V of the Act.196  The EPA’s promulgation of the Tai-
loring Rule demonstrated that the framework of the CAA is indeed 
workable for regulating GHG emissions and protecting the environ-
ment from climate change. 
The EPA acted in accordance with Congressional intent and 
in compliance with the Court’s ruling in Massachusetts when it 
promulgated the Tailoring Rule.  As the Supreme Court emphasized 
in Massachusetts, the CAA must be flexible enough to support the 
legislative intent of Congress while protecting the health and welfare 
of the public.197  Congress expressly authorized the EPA to make rea-
sonable interpretations of ambiguity in the Act.198  As the numerical 
threshold limits provided by PSD and Title V did not contemplate 
GHGs, and cannot meaningfully apply to GHGs, the EPA has the au-
thority to resolve such ambiguity.  Further, the EPA’s enactment of 
the Tailoring Rule was a direct response to the framework provided 
by the Court in Massachusetts; however, the Court in UARG imper-
missibly considered the potential economic and administrative costs 
over Congressional intent and the protection of public health and wel-
fare.199 
Finally, the Court’s holding that BACT is applicable to GHGs 
for “anyway sources” is counterintuitive.200  The Court read “any pol-
lutant subject to regulation under this chapter” for BACT purposes as 
broader than the term “any air pollutant” for PSD and Title V.201  Af-
ter effectively contradicting its previous holding in Massachusetts, in 
which the Court determined that GHGs were an air pollutant subject 
to regulation under the Act, the conclusion that GHGs could not be 
included in the term “any air pollutant” for PSD purposes showcases 
the Court’s selective application of the plain statutory text geared to-
ward achieving certain results. 
The EPA is authorized to promulgate reasonable regulations 
that can effectively regulate GHGs under the CAA.  Because of the 
potential for significant harm to public health and welfare, courts 
should support the EPA’s responsibility to regulate GHGs as sup-
 
196 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439-40. 
197 Id. at 533. 
198 Massachusetts, 549 U.S.at 842-43. 
199 Id. at 866 n.20 (citing Emissions Offset Interpretative Ruling, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524, 
55,527 (1976)). 
200 UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2449. 
201 Id. 
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ported by the language of the CAA, as intended by Congress, and as 
confirmed in the Supreme Court’s previous GHG decisions.  By first 
commanding the EPA to regulate (as in Massachusetts), and then 
prohibiting meaningful regulation of stationary sources for PSD pur-
poses (as in UARG), the Supreme Court provided the EPA with con-
flicting law that will likely result in continued litigation depending 
upon case-by-case determinations as to which CAA provisions are 
applicable to GHGs.  The Court’s previous determinations that the 
EPA is obligated to promulgate regulations to prevent harms associ-
ated with global warming that are both “actual” and “imminent”202 
were undercut by its determination in UARG. 
 
 
202 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521. 
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